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Summary of main points 
 
 Policy on nuclear and other WMD non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament 
should be integrated with strategy on conventional weapons to implement a holistic 
approach within a new Strategic Concept for the Regulation of Arms Possession and 
Proliferation. 
 Existing agreements on non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament should be 
viewed as platforms for expansion rather than relics in need of repair. 
 The NPT regime faces an uncertain future and the importance of the 2010 meeting 
hinges on all states parties (and those 3 outside) working cooperatively to address the 
issue of nuclear weapons and civil energy in the context of global and regional 
security needs. 
 Non-proliferation policy has produced useful innovations in law-based approaches 
but needs to be reconnected to the strategy of security through effective and verifiable 
agreements. 
 
1.  The UK Government initiatives on nuclear disarmament, WMD, cluster munitions 
and the Arms Trade Treaty show a significant commitment across the spectrum of the non-
proliferation and disarmament agenda. It has been noted before that WMD disarmament and 
non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin. Similarly, while there is no linkage between 
conventional and WMD control strategies there is much to be gained to developing them in a 
mutually reinforcing manner. There are now latent and converging interests in addressing 
major conventional weapons holdings and proliferation as well as WMD. Globally, the core 
constituency actively pursing nuclear and WMD non-proliferation and disarmament can 
usefully combine  with the broader coalitions interested in controls on conventional 
armaments. 
 
2.  President-elect Obama’s public commitment to a world with no nuclear weapons is 
the first time that an American President has been elected with such an explicit commitment 
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to disarmament; with far less public attention Russia appears to have made a range of 
proposals on security and disarmament. Barack Obama has given support to issues such as 
removing nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert that have not been accepted by the 
Department of Defence despite decades of pressure from the NGOs. The international 
challenge is to ensure that  initiatives such as this, helped by former senior officials, are not a 
false dawn similar to the rejection of nuclear weapons by General Butler and others in the 
mid-1990s. Much of the outcome will depend on internal U.S. dynamics. However a nuclear-
only approach will need to be complemented by a broader approach to security so that 
nuclear-only initiatives do not founder on a lack of integration with wider issues, not least in 
the Middle East.  
 
Developing a strategy on conventional arms. 
3.  There are a number of convergent global issues and interests that favour the 
development of a global approach to the regulation of the possession and proliferation of 
major conventional weapons. These include: (1) nuclear and other WMD disarmament 
requires attention to regional security issues that include a conventional focus; (2) holdings 
and production of conventional arms in general are emerging as an issue in debates on the 
Arms Trade Treaty and on weapons systems or categories under SALW and Cluster 
Munitions; (3) some states see progress on ‘General and Complete Disarmament’ as linked to 
nuclear disarmament in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – and 
globalisation of some provisions of the CFE/CSBMs and Open Skies offer a means of 
realising this NPT provision rather than regarding it as an obstacle to progress on nuclear 
disarmament. (4) Recession driven defence cuts in the shorter term will provide strains on U.S. 
international commitments that regional agreements may ameliorate. (5) An major expansion 
of effective arms control is an effective preventive measure to the well-known conflict 
pressures arising from international economic slump. (6)The European agreements on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the associated Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures (CSBMs) and Open Skies regime provide a strong and unprecedented 
institutional platform for expansion that should not be allowed to collapse through NATO-
Russia disputes. 
 
 
From START to SCRAP 
4.  The next NPT meeting is scheduled for 2010 and much needs to be done to avoid the 
problems of 2005. The international community's earlier breakthroughs are again an 
inspiration here: for the long-standing legal commitment (embodied in the nuclear non-
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proliferation treaty [1970]) to "general disarmament" of all weapons save those needed for 
internal policing is actually in sight. Just as the acronym START (Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty) denotes the nuclear-arms talks leading to the treaties of 1991 and 1993, today's 
equivalent could be SCRAP - A Strategic Concept for Regulation  of Arms Possession and 
Proliferation. 
 
5. In 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact began talks on arms reductions: by 1991 they 
had signed a treaty that saw 52,000 of their tanks, warplanes, artillery guns and helicopters 
destroyed. Ronald Reagan reached agreements with Mikhail Gorbachev that led to many 
thousands of nuclear missiles going the same way. More than 20,000 nuclear warheads have 
been dismantled, leaving some 30,000 intact. In this same period, near-universal agreements 
banned chemical weapons and the test-firing of nuclear weapons; as a result, global test-
firings since 1996 have been reduced almost to zero (previously the US and the Soviet Union 
had been firing off hundreds a year). 
 
6. The continuation of the Nunn-Lugar programme and recent initiatives to revive the 
FMCT talks are positive signs. Useful innovations in practical – including non-violent – 
methods of controlling dangerous commodities including nuclear materials, for example in 
transport and logistics, have come gradually as the disarmament and arms control mainstream 
has both dwindled and split. The novel legislative approach embodied in UNSCR 1540 is 
certainly a step in the right direction in the battle on illicit WMD transfers but it has suffered 
through problems of implementation at the state level. Efforts to create new initiatives for 
example on the “illicit trade” in small arms and light weapons are floundering on narrow 
conceptions of security sector reform (SSR) and the international rule of law. 
 
7. With respect to conventional arms, the overwhelming vote in the General Assembly 
for a coordinated UN process to consider the feasibility, scope and parameters of a global 
Arms Trade Treaty reflects an increased international concern in arms control debates with 
humanitarian, human rights and development standards and impacts. However, to achieve 
these ends, this concern needs to also be directed at initiatives to reduce holdings of major 
weapons systems, ordnance stocks and production, and not only to the control of the 
conventional weapons trade. Moreover, the parallel surge of interest by the international 
donor community, reflected in the OECD Development Assistance Committee, in using such 
standards to measure the success of security sector reform requires the development of an 
integrated, risk-based approach to equipment and weaponry, and hence to disarmament, in the 
re-shaping of military, security and policing institutions – one without the other will not 
deliver sustained security.  
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8. What is needed is not to set aside the useful aspects of the new, piecemeal approach 
towards proliferation but to reunite them with a renewed ‘classical’ process based on 
strategies towards disarmament and the use of treaty and rule of law methods - with the 
associated principles of equity, objectivity, universality and transparency. This new 
combination could achieve a more rational division of labour and subsidiarity. Such an 
approach should fill dangerous gaps in the pattern of coverage and effort, and minimise the 
double-think and double standards that are rife in current policies and practices. 
 
A realistic prospect  
9. Much can be done to advance a Strategic Concept for the Regulations of Arms 
Possession and Proliferation- including setting deadlines to conclude negotiations and 
implement agreements. It took just eighteen months to overcome the ideological and 
technological issues governing the cold-war armies. Today, with this precedent as a guide and 
no ideological barrier comparable to the confrontation with communism, a "general 
disarmament agreement" could be scheduled within two years of the talks starting. The basis 
for a global-disarmament compact is provided by current agreements. There have been 
arguments for and against timetables. One notable success was the 1996 CTBT, agreed by a 
date set at the 1995 NPT meeting. For public opinion used to target dates for climate change 
and the Millennium Development Goals – disarmament targets are an obvious next step.  
 
10. A way ahead is to adapt procedures that have worked in the past rather than engage in 
developing a new set. The ‘best practice’ here lies in the UNMOVIC work in Iraq and in the 
work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). UN inspectors should have access 
to the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) as well as to the ‘smaller’ nuclear powers (India, Pakistan 
and Israel). These procedures will also be effective in restricting terrorist access to nuclear 
technology; and they can be adapted to work with biological and chemical weapons.  
   
11. In practice, the Start and intermediate nuclear force (INF) agreements of the Reagan-
Gorbachev era should be extended to all states, and include missile defence and Star Wars 
systems. The European agreements reducing and regulating tanks, artillery, helicopters and 
war planes should also be globalised and include naval vessels. Most of the technical work 
has already been done for all these agreements; implementation could be as swift as in the 
most effective existing agreements. 75% of all stocks would be verifiably "Scrap'd" in two 
years; the remaining quarter would be cut again by 75% in the next two years; until, after a 
decade, they are all gone.  
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12. An international coalition must build upon the important precedents set by the 
Canberra Commission, the Blix Commission, governmental initiatives by the likes of Norway, 
Germany and the UK, and non-governmental reports from BASIC to Amnesty across the 
spectrum of human security. The bonus for citizens in every country, taxpayers, the poor and 
the global economy as a whole would be immense. 
 
Globalising the End of the Cold War Treaties 
13. The following paragraphs are an adaptation of the informal proposal to globalise the 
INF Treaty made by a number of States to the UN Conference on Disarmament in November 
2007. It extends it to include other major agreements made at the end of the Cold War and 
include sea-launched systems. It is designed to complement both the recent proposals on 
security suggested by Russia and by Barack Obama. 
 
14. "Basic elements of an international legally-binding arrangement on the elimination of 
strategic, intermediate-range, shorter-range and short range missiles;  verification of nuclear 
weapon manufacturing and stockpiles; verification of biological disarmament and verification 
of conventional armed forces holdings and manufacture,  open for broad international 
accession" 
 
15. Preamble 
The States Parties to this Arrangement, 
Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability both globally and regionally, 
Convinced that the measures set forth in this Arrangement will help to reduce the risk of 
outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, 
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete 
disarmament under strict international control, 
Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
16. Article I 
General Obligations 
1. Each State Party to this Arrangement upon entry into force of this Arrangement 
and thereafter shall not produce or flight-test any strategic, intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such 
missiles. 
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2. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall eliminate all its strategic-range, 
intermediate-range and shorter-range and short-range missiles and launchers of such 
missiles, as well as all support structures and equipment associated with such missiles and 
launchers, being in its possession or ownership, or being located in any site or on any 
vessel under its jurisdiction or control, under categories subject to an agreement, so that 
no later than the agreed date after entry into force of this Arrangement and thereafter no 
such missiles, launchers or support structures and equipment shall be possessed by each 
State Party. 
3. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall permit inspections on its territory 
consistent with the provisions developed by UNMOVIC with respect to nuclear and 
biological weapons and carry out the verified elimination of such weapons and supporting 
technologies and infrastructure according to a timetable agreed.  
4. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall not produce or test any weapon 
system of category types described in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 
regardless of whether they are fitted to land, air or sea systems. 
5.  Each State Party to this Arrangement shall provide data to other States Parties to 
this Arrangement concerning weapon systems of all category types within the CFE Treaty 
whether operated from land or at sea.  
6. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall adhere to the Open Skies Treaty 
7. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall adhere to the Vienna Confidence and 
Security Building Measures developed by the OSCE 
 
17. Article II 
Rules of Accounting and Definitions of Types of Weapons systems 
Provisions for Rules of Accounting and Definitions of Types weapons and supporting 
technologies are subject to an agreement pursuant to the adapted provisions of START, INF, 
UNMOVIC, CFE, CSBMs 
 
18. Article  III 
Limitations on numbers of weapons and supporting technologies are subject to an agreement, 
 
19. Article IV 
Exchange of an Information Related to the Obligations 
Provisions for exchange of an information under categories of data, related to the obligations 
provided for by this Arrangement, are subject to an agreement pursuant to the provisions of 
START, INF, UNMOVIC, CFE, CSBMs and drawing on the timetables therein. 
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20. Article V 
Elimination Procedures 
Each State Party to this Arrangement shall eliminate all its strategic, intermediate  range, 
shorter-range, and short range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support 
structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance 
with the procedures which are subject to an agreement. Each State Party to this Arrangement 
shall reduce the other categories of weapon systems and supporting equipment and 
manufacturing capability subject to agreement. 
 
21. Article VI 
Rules of Compliance Verification 
Rules of compliance verification are subject to an agreement. 
 
22. Article VII 
Definitions shall draw on the relevant paragraphs of the treaties listed herein. 
 
23. Article VIII 
The Organization for Implementation of the Arrangement 
The States Parties to this Arrangement shall come to an agreement about mechanism of 
implementation of the subject and the objective of this Arrangement. 
 
24. Article IX 
Duration of the Arrangement 
This Arrangement shall be of unlimited duration. 
 
25. Article X 
Amendments, Signature, Accession, Ratification, Entry into Force, Reservations, Depositary, 
Authentic Texts 
Amendments, signature, accession, ratification, entry into force, reservations, depositary, 
authentic texts are subject to an agreement. 
